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ABSTRACT 
Integrating agency theory with institutional analysis in international business, we propose a 
state-control perspective to analyze government-control mechanisms in emerging economies’ 
globalization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We identify two types of state control that influence 
SOEs’ globalization decisions and the degree of globalization: state ownership control and executives’ 
political connections, both of which are contingent upon the home country’s evolving institutional 
environments. Using a two-step corporate globalization decision model and 17,272 firm-year 
observations of non-financial, Chinese-listed companies, we find a strong impact of both types of state 
control on SOEs’ globalization, although the impacts differ between the periods before and after 
domestic governance reform and across different globalization-decision steps. The diminishing impact 
of executives’ political connections and the increasing impact of state ownership control on firms’ 
degree of globalization demonstrate the evolving relationship between the state and the managers, as 
well as the dynamics of state control in globalizing SOEs.  
Keywords: Agency theory, state control, state ownership, political connections, state-owned 
enterprises, corporate globalization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The spectacular growth of globalization by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from emerging 
economies over the past few decades contradicts most traditional international business (IB) theories. 
Numerous studies, which have attempted to explain the patterns and motivations behind SOEs’ 
globalization, have emphasized that “the state (government) matters.” However, the mechanisms by 
which the state matters remains largely unexplored. Corporate globalization is a complex 
decision-making process that involves conflicts among multiple constituencies, including the 
home-country state, the host-country state, SOE managers, and minority shareholders as well as each 
constituency’s underlying, evolving institutions (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Cui & Jiang, 
2012; Luo & Wang, 2012). This complex undertaking requires an in-depth and nuanced analysis on 
state-control mechanisms at the decision-maker level—particularly in the relationship between state and 
SOE managers in different institutional environments—and has received comparatively little attention in 
the literature. In addition, IB researchers have only until recently realized the importance of studying the 
role of the managerial decision-making process in the actions of multinational companies (MNCs), 
including SOEs (Aharoni, Tihanyi, & Connelly, 2011). These deficiencies call for a more integrative 
view on the roles of the state and managerial decision making in SOEs’ globalization.  
We address these issues in this paper by proposing a state-control perspective on SOEs’ 
globalization to answer the question: How does state control influence the degree of SOEs’ 
globalization from emerging economies? We investigate this question primarily from the perspective of 
the state’s governance mechanisms in SOEs that shape the state-manager relationship and their 
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globalization decisions. Among various theoretical perspectives related to this inquiry, the agency theory 
is probably the most appropriate in describing the state-manager relationship and the managerial 
decision-making process. However, the agency theory does not consider how managerial incentives and 
the state’s interests differ, nor has it been systematically applied to the context of globalization. In many 
emerging economies, SOE managers are often directly appointed by the state after serving as 
government officials (Brockman, Rui, & Zou, 2013; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007) and their companies go 
global following the guidance and capital control by the home state (Cui & Jiang, 2012). 
Correspondingly, SOE managers are incentivized not just by the prospect of increasing economic 
performance but also (and more importantly) by fulfilling the state’s political and social objectives in 
devising globalization strategies (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009a; 2009b). Therefore, the picture of the 
state-manager relationship, managerial incentives, and the corresponding control mechanisms in 
globalization can be different from that depicted by traditional agency theory and contingent on the 
institutional environments.  
Such institutional roles are closely related to the institutional analysis in strategy and IB (e.g., 
Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009), which emphasizes the importance of 
institutional environments and firm response in the choices of multinationals’ globalization strategies. In 
our conception, institutional environment can be administrative and market-oriented. The administrative 
institutions in the home state rely on political connections and are a substitute for market-based 
pecuniary incentives abroad, which align the interests of SOE managers with that of the state. In contrast, 
the market-oriented institutions in the home state rely on an ownership arrangement and are compatible 
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with pecuniary incentives internationally, but also increase the information asymmetry and agency costs 
between the state, the SOE, and foreign subsidiary managers. Consequently, SOEs’ degree of 
globalization is inherently affected by different governance mechanisms and the underlying institutional 
environment. 
We examine our state-control perspective on the globalization of SOEs from China. China launched 
its “Go Global” policy with regard to SOEs, which were hailed as “national champions,” and have 
boosted China’s soaring outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) since 2000 (Lin & Milhaupt, 2013). 
Moreover, China started the split-share structural reform in 2006 as part of its ongoing changes during 
the market transition that extensively transferred the state shares in SOEs to private investors (Haveman 
& Wang, 2013)
i
 and transformed the corporate governance model from administrative to 
market-oriented (Peng 2003; Ralston, Terpstra-Tong, Terpstra, Wang, & Egri, 2006). All these features 
offer us an ideal setting in which to study the dynamics of institutions and state control in SOEs’ 
globalization. In addition, such governance reforms are not unique to China but are widely occurring in 
other emerging economies (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013; Inoue, Lazzarini, & 
Musacchio, 2014). 
Our paper makes two main contributions to the IB and SOE literature. At the basic level, we 
disentangle the mechanisms of state control in SOEs’ globalization. While the dominant role of the 
government in globalizing SOEs has been reiterated in many studies, the underlying mechanisms are 
still far from clear. As we show in this paper, it is crucial to examine the governance mechanisms—both 
the government ownership stakes and executives’ political connections—that shape managerial 
4 
 
incentives, agency concerns, and the state-manager relationship in the complex globalization process. 
Secondly, we contribute to the understanding of the managerial decision-making role in globalization, 
which is an important yet underexplored area of IB research (Aharoni et al., 2011). By showing that 
SOEs’ globalization decisions are influenced by the state control mechanisms through different decision 
processes and institutional environments, we bridge an acknowledged gap between macro- and 
micro-level dynamics of globalization. Our broader conclusion is that investigating the dynamics of state 
control in globalization decisions is essential in understanding emerging SOEs’ behaviors around the 
globe. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
To theoretically investigate the complexity and dynamics of globalization under state control, we 
propose a state-control perspective by extending the agency theory and integrating it with the recently 
developed institutional analysis in IB. Our state-control perspective identifies two alternative SOE 
government-control mechanisms that lead to different levels of globalization. The high-risk features of 
globalization and potential conflicts of interest among multiple constituents require both ownership-based 
and connection-based means of control that complement each other in tackling cross-border risks and 
agency conflicts (Peng, 2003; Peng et al., 2009). The ownership-based means emphasizes direct control 
through government ownership and voting rights on corporate decision making in globalization. The 
connection-based means emphasizes indirect control that takes place through the manager’s social and 
psychological contract with the domestic state. Both means help reduce information asymmetry between 
the state and SOEs and facilitate SOEs to carry out the state’s goals in cross-border deals with lower 
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agency costs. We therefore propose that the state’s ownership control and executives’ political connections 
are the two major ways in which the domestic state controls SOEs’ globalization, and managers adapt to 
such controls in formulating their globalization strategies. 
The impact of these two major mechanisms of state control on SOEs’ globalization is manifested by 
the changing institutional environment, from administrative to market-oriented, which can be studied in 
the context of the domestic ownership-based governance reform—the reform aimed at transferring 
ownership from the hands of the state to that of the market (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009b; Inoue et al., 
2013). Although both are governance mechanisms, the state’s control through political connections is 
enacted more in the institutional environment dominated by administrative orders (i.e., before governance 
reform), while the state’s ownership control is enacted more in the institutional environment characterized 
by well-functioning market disciplines and market-oriented ownership arrangements (i.e., after 
governance reform). Therefore, different domestic institutional environments influence the extent to 
which certain control mechanisms are enabled. These mechanisms also differ in their compatibility with 
institutions in the host country, which affects the degree of globalization abroad. We summarize the 
evolution of the state-manager relationship and state-control mechanisms in Table 1, in which we attach 
the two general institutional environments to two time periods: before and after corporate governance 
reform. The contexts in Table 1 are based on Chinese experience for the easiness of illustration. However, 
the mechanisms are generalizable to SOEs in other emerging economies. We further develop several 
testable hypotheses on such dynamics of state control on SOEs’ globalization in the following section.  
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
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The Vertical Evolvement of State Control on SOE’s Globalization 
First, we propose that the effectiveness of the two state-control mechanisms relies on different 
enabling institutions. Consequently, the functioning of the two means of state control over globalization 
undergo changes over time (i.e., “vertically”) in accordance with changes in their institutional 
environments. Ownership control relies mainly on modern property-rights institutions to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency costs between the principal (the state) and the agent (the manager) 
domestically (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009a; 2009b; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Inoue et al., 2013; also see 
Table 1). This effect also relies on compatibility with the host-country institutions, which helps to reduce 
agency costs in overseas operations. In contrast, the political personnel control—control through political 
connections—relies on administrative and bureaucratic institutions to align the interests of the manager 
with those of the state, especially when the market institutions are weak and the domestic governance is 
less compatible with host-country institutions (Brockman et al., 2013; Fan, Wong, & Zhang 2007; also 
see Table 1). Accordingly, firms adjust their globalization strategies in response to changes in their 
external institutional environments (Peng, 2003).  
Under state ownership control, the effect of control on SOEs’ globalization is weak when 
home-country property rights are poorly defined and protected, and when home-country institutions are 
dominated by administrative orders that are less compatible with more market-oriented institutions 
internationally. This is usually the case when domestic institutions are authoritarian without proper 
corporate governance reform (Shleifer, 1998; Chang & Wong, 2004). However, when home-country 
property rights are more clearly defined following domestic governance reform (Haveman & Wang, 2013; 
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Peng, 2003), SOEs’ governance structures become more market-oriented and compatible with 
international governance practices (Megginsion & Netter, 2001). These governance practices include, for 
example, a standard selection process for directors and executives and the introduction of independent 
directors, which provide more ownership-based tools for state control in overseas operation. Moreover, 
block ownership gives the state an incentive to monitor and evaluate SOE managers’ performance (Lin & 
Milhaupt, 2013). As a result, the functioning of ownership control is more likely to be institutionally 
enacted. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1a. State ownership control has a stronger impact on SOEs’ globalization after corporate 
governance reform than before reform. 
In contrast, political connection control functions in the opposite way in globalization. Before 
domestic governance reform, the administrative institutional environment was conducive to the use of 
political personnel control to influence SOE managers’ decision making due to weak property rights 
institutions and scarcity of market-based systems for efficient international resource allocation (Brockman 
et al., 2013). However, such a role for political connections is attenuated by the continuing domestic 
market-oriented reforms, as more resources supporting SOEs’ globalization are gradually transferred from 
the government’s hands to the private sector and increasingly coordinated by the developing factor 
markets (Hoskisson et al., 2013). In addition, greater compatibility between the home country and 
international corporate governance regimes provides less scope for functional administrative orders 
(political personnel control). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H1b. Managers’ political connections have a stronger impact on SOEs’ globalization before 
corporate governance reform than after reform. 
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The Horizontal Evolvement of State Control on SOEs’ Globalization 
We now propose that the functioning of the two state-control mechanisms also evolves 
interchangeably (“horizontally”) in accordance with changes in the enabling institutions. We argue that 
the home state realizes the different levels of effectiveness of the two available control mechanisms 
contingent on different institutional environments, thus can adapt to domestic institutional transitions with 
alternate mechanisms to maintain its impact, and SOE managers adapt to such mechanisms in their 
globalization strategies. Before governance reform, a weak home-country institutional environment 
makes managers behave more like politicians because they are directly appointed and closely watched by 
state administrators (Chang & Wong, 2004; Ralston et al., 2006). Consequently, SOE managers’ interests 
are more aligned with those of the state (Boisot & Child, 1988). Therefore, information asymmetry is low 
between the state and SOE managers but high between the home country and host countries because of 
different governance regimes (Luo &Wang, 2012). As a result, the state uses domestic political 
connections rather than ownership control as a more efficient and less costly means of controlling SOEs’ 
globalization. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2a. Before corporate governance reform, the roles of the state relative to SOEs’ 
globalization functioned more likely through managers’ political connections rather than through 
state ownership control.  
After governance reform, compatibility between the market-based institutions of the home country 
and international-governance regimes leads to SOE managers behaving more like professional executives 
as they are more often elected and monitored by boards of directors (Megginson & Netter, 2001). As a 
result, SOE managers’ interests are more often in conflict with those of the state, and the information 
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asymmetry between the state and SOE managers is higher, particularly during globalization (Knutsen, 
Rygh, Hveem, 2011). In such cases, state ownership control is more efficient for the state to curb 
managerial opportunism and reduce agency costs in these state-owned MNCs under a market-oriented 
governance system (Li & Qian, 2013; Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). SOE managers also respond to a 
new institutional regime by conforming more to the ownership arrangement in their globalization 
strategies so as to better leverage the state’s resource advantages and preferential policies to overcome 
uncertainties abroad (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2014; Meyer, Ding, Li, & Zhang, 2014). Consequently, the 
state-control mechanism to influence SOEs’ globalization shifts from relying mainly on administrative 
orders to relying mainly on market-based orders. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2b. After corporate governance reform, the roles of the state relative to SOEs’ globalization 
functioned more likely through state ownership control rather than through managers’ political 
connections. 
State Control in the Decision-Making Process: First Step vs. Second Step 
Finally, we propose that the managerial decision-making process under state control of SOEs’ 
globalization tends to take sequential steps. Some literature makes a similar argument that firms’ 
strategic choices are endogenous and self-selected under institutional constraints (Dastidar, 2009; Gao, 
Murray, Kotabe, & Lu, 2010) and thus also follow sequential decisions (Tallman & Shenkar, 1994; 
Aharoni et al., 2011; Peng, 2012; Sun, Peng, Lee, & Tan, 2014). We therefore propose that the 
globalization decision is structured as a two-step process: in the first step, the SOE decides whether or 
not to go global; in the second step, the SOE decides on the extent to which the firm will invest 
abroad—i.e., the degree of globalization. Correspondingly, the impact of state control can vary across 
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the two steps. Such a managerial decision-making process also matches the process of state control in 
globalization: at the initial stage, the government frequently uses administrative orders to select and 
approve certain SOEs as national champions (Li & Milhaupt, 2013) in “going global” via intensive 
capital control, which is prevalent among bureaucratic and interventionist governments in emerging 
economies (Fogel, 2006).
ii
 However, the government gives more discretionary power to the degree to 
which SOEs want to globalize in the later stages of investment. Our interviews with several SOE 
managers confirm the conjecture of the two-step process. 
Based on the above conjectures and observations, we argue that the roles of state ownership control 
and political connection control differ across the two-step decision process. During the first step when 
the SOE has not gone abroad yet, globalization decisions are made in the home-country context, where 
information asymmetry between the state and the SOE manager is low, and administrative orders by the 
state are frequently used for capital control and industry policies (such as the approval of which 
companies can go abroad) (Hassard, Morris, Sheehan, & Xiao, 2010; Sun et al., 2014; UNCTAD, 2011). 
Therefore, under this administrative environment, political connection is a more effective and less costly 
means for the state to control whether to globalize an SOE and control its manager in order to implement 
desired globalization strategies. Moreover, this effect should be more salient before governance reform 
because the administrative governance environment is more conducive to the functioning of political 
connection control. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3a. Managers’ political connections function more likely in the first step of the globalization 
decision-making process rather than the second step (especially before governance reform).  
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During the second step when the SOE has gone abroad, the decision on the degree of globalization 
is largely made in the host-country context, where information asymmetry and agency costs between the 
state and the SOE manager—as well as between the home-country headquarters and the host-country 
subsidiaries—are relatively high (Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002; Luo & Wang, 2012). Operational risks 
also increase during this phase due to uncertainties in overseas sales and productions, which require 
well-defined risk-sharing mechanisms (Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 2013). Correspondingly, state 
ownership control is more efficient in curbing managerial-agency problems and thus shaping 
globalization decisions. In addition, the state can also better distribute incomes and profits that are 
obtained from globalization between SOEs and the state based on ownership arrangement (Agmon, 
2003), and such ownership arrangement is more likely to be accepted by more developed host countries 
where formal institutions are well established. Moreover, this effect should be more salient in the period 
after governance reform because the market-oriented institutional environment is more conducive to the 
functioning of state ownership control (Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Luo & Wang, 2012). Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H3b. State ownership control functions more likely in the second step of the globalization 
decision-making process rather than the first step (especially after governance reform). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data and Sample 
We empirically test our hypotheses using data on all non-financial Chinese firms listed on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, of which SOEs account for more than 80% of total market 
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capitalization.
iii
 Our data are obtained from Datastream, WIND, CSMAR, and the China Center for 
Economic Research (CCER) databases.
iv
 We manually collect data for our key dependent variable—the 
firm’s degree of globalization (DOG)—and for the variables regarding manager characteristics and 
backgrounds from their curricula vitae. We cross-validate the company names, stock IDs, and manager 
names across different data sources and their annual reports, and the inter-code reliability is above 95%. 
Our sample covers the 2001–2011 period, starting with the implementation of the “Go Global” policy. 
Before 2001, the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) volumes from China were very low, which 
left little data for observation. We exclude the firms that were labeled as Special Treatment (ST) by the 
stock exchanges (under severe financial distress) before 2006. Finally, our sample includes 17,272 
firm-year observations (2,394 firms in total, which is more than 92% of all listed firms) from China.
v
 
Empirical Strategy and Descriptive Statistics 
To distinguish the effects of the two mechanisms of state control on SOEs’ globalization before and 
after governance reform, which in our case is the 2006 split-share reform in China, we use two 
approaches. The first approach is to split our sample into the pre-reform subsample and the post-reform 
subsample; the second is to treat the split-share reform as a natural experiment and test the effect of this 
shock on the whole sample (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Figure 1 conceptually illustrates the testable 
hypotheses on the mechanisms of state control in SOEs’ globalization. 
[Insert Fig. 1 about here.] 
To empirically model the aforementioned two-step decision-making process and deal with the 
potential self-selection endogeneity issue in globalization, we adopt a Tobit II model that entails a 
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two-step estimation (the Heckman test; Heckman, 1979). In the first step, we create a binary variable 
(GOGLOBAL) as our dependent variable that equals 1 if a firm is involved in globalization (has decided 
to go global), and 0 otherwise (Sun et al., 2014). The first-step estimation is essentially a Logit model 
that captures the “self-selection” effect and calculates the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). In the second step, 
we use a firm’s Degree of Globalization (DOG) as the dependent variable, which is the average of three 
key dimensions of globalization, similar to Carpenter, Sanders, and Gregersen (2001): (1) the ratio of a 
firm’s foreign assets (foreign production) to its total assets (total production) (% foreign assets), (2) the 
ratio of a firm’s foreign sales to its total sales (% foreign sales), and (3) the ratio of a firm’s number of 
foreign subsidiaries to the total number of subsidiaries (% foreign subsidiaries). We then include the 
IMR calculated in the first step with other independent variables in the second step. In addition, we 
control for industry and year fixed effects. 
To avoid perfect linearity between the two steps in the Tobit II model, we exclude Firm Size in the 
first step in order to make the number of independent variables smaller than that of the second step. In 
addition, we use the continuous variable Government Ownership in the first step (Cui & Jiang, 2012; 
Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012) and replace it with the dummy variable State Ultimate Control in the 
second step (Inoue et al., 2013; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012) as the key independent variable because 
the state’s direct ownership is diluted following overseas sales, subsidiaries, and production. Also, we 
use both the top managers’ political backgrounds (Manager Political) and the proportion of directors 
with political ties on the board (Board Political Ties) to proxy for executives’ political connections 
(Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio, 2006). Furthermore, we use managers’ technology backgrounds and 
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educational levels as proxies for their capability, which is often viewed as MNCs’ resources embodied 
within human capital in the IB literature (Aharoni et al., 2006). Detailed definitions of our key variables 
are shown in Table 2. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3 and the correlations of the variables 
proposed above are shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Tables 2–4 about here.] 
 
FINDINGS 
Subsample Analysis 
In Table 5, we show the results on the determinants of SOEs’ globalization from the Tobin II 
regressions. We first report the results on the pre-reform sample and the post-reform sample, 
respectively. As mentioned earlier, in the first step we use Government Ownership as the dependent 
variable to capture direct control by the state through shareholding, while in the second step we use the 
State Ultimate Control dummy to capture the effect of indirect ownership control due to dilution.  
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
Several interesting observations appear. First, in terms of the effect of state ownership control 
(Government Ownership or State Ultimate Control) on going global and on the degree of globalization, 
the coefficient is statistically significant only in the post-reform sample, with a one-standard-deviation 
increase in state ultimate control associated with an approximate 5% increase in the degree of 
globalization. However, there is no such statistical significance in the pre-reform sample. In contrast, 
and in terms of the effect of political connections on globalization, the coefficients of Managerial 
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Political and Board Political Ties are both positive and statistically significant at the 99% level in the 
pre-reform sample. The marginal effect of managerial political connections increases the degree of 
globalization by about 3%, while a one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of politically 
connected directors on a board is associated with an approximate 2% (0.160 × 0.106 [marginal effect]) 
increase in the degree of globalization. However, both the statistical significance and the economic 
significance of these two political connection variables are attenuated in the post-reform sample, and the 
sign occasionally even becomes negative, making the net-marginal effect on globalization much smaller. 
Furthermore, the difference in the coefficients between these two subsamples is also statistically 
significant.
vi
 The results suggest that the role of state ownership control has a stronger impact on SOEs’ 
globalization after domestic governance reform than before, while that of managerial political 
connections has a stronger impact on SOEs’ globalization decisions before domestic governance reform. 
The Z scores from the Wald Chi-square tests for state ownership control, managerial political 
connections, and board political ties across the two subsamples are all higher than 2, indicating that the 
effects differ significantly across the two periods. Therefore, both H1a and H1b are supported. 
Second, and contrasting the two mechanisms of state control, while the coefficient of managerial 
political connections is statistically significant and has a positive sign during the first step in the 
pre-reform sample, neither measure of state ownership control is significant in this period. This finding 
indicates that before governance reform, the positive roles of the state with regard to globalization 
function mainly through a manager’s political connections rather than through state ownership control. 
In the post-reform sample, the coefficient of state ownership control becomes more significant than that 
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of managerial political connections and board political ties. This result implies that the effect of the state 
on SOEs’ globalization mainly functions through state ownership control rather than managers’ political 
connections after governance reform. Our H2a and H2b are therefore supported. 
We further compare the effects of the two state-control mechanisms on globalization across 
different decision steps. In the pre-reform subsample, the coefficients of managerial political 
connections and board political ties are statistically significant in the first step but not in the second step. 
In the post-reform sample, although the coefficient of Board Political Ties is still positive and 
significant in the second step, its magnitude and significance are much smaller. The statistical 
significance in the post-reform period may be explained by the fact that board structure is also part of 
modern corporate governance mechanisms. In contrast, the coefficient of state ownership control is 
significant in the second step in the post-reform sample but not in the first step throughout the two 
subsamples. These results confirm H3a and H3b that political connections mainly have an impact on 
SOEs’ globalization in the first step in the home-country context, while state ownership control mainly 
has an impact in the second step in the host-country context. 
In addition, a manager’s global mindset (proxied by overseas experience) and education level have 
significantly positive effects on globalization during both periods, and particularly in the first step in 
which the home-country context is more significant. The manager’s technology background seems to be 
more important in the first step before governance reform, but this shifts to the second step after reform. 
These results indicate the importance of management professionalization in globalization.  
Natural Experiment Analysis 
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We then show the results of treating domestic governance reform as a natural experiment to 
examine the effects of state control on globalization by generating a post-reform dummy and interacting 
it with our above-mentioned, state-control variables. The results are reported in Table 6 and, as can be 
seen, the previous results are upheld and become even stronger. In the first step, the coefficients of state 
ownership control are not significant, while the coefficients of manager political and board political ties 
are highly significant. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms Manager political × 
Post-reform dummy and Board political ties ×Post-reform dummy are both negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that the effects of political connections decrease after governance reform. In 
contrast, in the second-step, the coefficients of State ultimate control ×Post-reform dummy are positive 
and statistically significant, indicating that the effect of state ownership control becomes stronger after 
governance reform, while none of the coefficients of political connections are significant. Therefore, our 
hypotheses on state control in globalization are upheld in this “laboratory” test. 
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
Robustness Checks 
We also conduct several robustness tests that include distinguishing between firms with more than 
30% state ownership (absolute SOEs) and less than 30% state ownership (non-SOEs), comparing 
globalization into emerging economies and developed economies, and specifically examining the 
petrochemical industry, and the metal and non-metal manufacturing industries. We also distinguish 
between managers with local government backgrounds vs. managers with central government 
backgrounds, between SOEs controlled by the central government vs. those controlled by local 
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governments, and among managers who are members of Congress, former government officers, or 
previously in the military services. In general, the results from these robustness tests are similar to, if not 
stronger than, the previous results, and largely support our state-control perspective on SOEs’ 
globalization.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Contributions to the Larger Literature 
We see our results as making two important contributions to the IB and SOE literature. First, while 
numerous studies on this subject have argued that “the state matters” (Alon, Child, Li, & McIntyre, 2011; 
Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Kalotay & Sulstarova, 2010; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012), the 
underlying mechanisms of how the state influences globalization decision making largely remain as a 
black box. We fill in the theoretical gap by extending the agency theory and integrating it with 
institutional analysis in IB to explain the dynamic process of the state’s influence on SOEs’ globalization. 
As we show in the cross-sample analysis (i.e., the robustness tests), the presence of the state per se is not 
a key predictor of globalization. Rather, it is the state-led governance and control mechanisms such as 
government ownership arrangements and executives’ political connections that are prevalent worldwide 
(Faccio, 2006), that carry out the influence of the state.  
Second, our research provides a more holistic view on the dynamics of globalization. The existing 
literature has studied such dynamics both at the macro (institutional) and the micro (corporate) 
decision-making levels. For example, at the macro level, institutional changes such as structural and 
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governance reforms can affect firms’ globalization—not only their exports (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 
2009a; 2009b) but also foreign direct investment and operations (Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). At the micro 
level, firms’ decision making on globalization is not only sequential (Tallman & Shenkar, 1994; Peng, 
2012), but also largely contingent on the specific home- and host-country contexts (Cui & Jiang, 2012; 
Ma & Delios, 2010). Our paper integrates the two levels of dynamics through the connecting link of 
state-manager relationships and the resulting governance mechanisms. Such a link offers a more in-depth 
understanding of the patterns of globalization.  
Implications for Practice  
Our study has important implications for policy makers and practitioners. Policymakers in host 
countries, especially those in developed economies, usually perceive the entry of SOEs from emerging 
economies as a political threat, while ignoring the SOEs’ market-based economic motivations. Our paper 
reveals that SOEs can establish market-oriented governance structures that are compatible with 
host-country environments and also potentially benefit the host country’s local economy. For 
policymakers in home countries, our study implies that as domestic institutions evolve, the ways in which 
they can effectively globalize SOEs also change. We have witnessed that governance structures of 
globalizing SOEs from China (e.g., PetroChina), India (e.g., State Bank of India), Russia (e.g., United 
Energy System of Russia), Brazil (e.g., Petrobras), and other transition economies become more 
market-oriented following corporate governance reforms (Gupta, 2005; Inoue et al., 2013). More 
advanced economies such as Singapore and Norway have taken a step forward and utilized their state 
ownership in sovereign wealth funds (e.g., Temasek Holdings and the Government Pension Fund of 
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Norway), which hold shares in major SOEs (e.g., Singapore Airlines, DBS bank, SingTel, and Statoil) to 
pursue long-term financial returns.
vii
 We expect that the effect of corporate governance reforms on SOEs’ 
globalization will become more salient as emerging economies adopt more market-based institutions. 
For SOE managers, our study suggests that understanding when and how different state-control 
mechanisms affect SOEs’ globalization decisions can help them to better leverage their specific 
institutional advantages. For example, SOE managers should be aware that political connections matter 
more in the home country when deciding whether or not to go global and may include domestic 
politicians among board members. They should also be aware that the government’s shares matter more in 
the host-country context when deciding how much to globalize and formulate a joint-ownership structure 
with foreign partners accordingly. Managers of rival MNCs from developed economies can learn from 
such state-control dynamics so as to better compete against or cooperate with these emerging giants. 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Despite these contributions and implications, our study is subject to some boundary conditions. First, 
our focus is on exploring the dynamic state-control mechanisms in SOEs’ globalization rather than on 
directly explaining the dramatic increase in SOEs’ globalization, such as the surge of OFDI after China’s 
“Go Global” policy was launched in 2000 (Luo et al., 2010). Second, our focus is on SOEs’ “degree of 
globalization,” rather than on the choices of location, industry, and entry mode. As we have discussed, 
these choices are all under the influence of state control at the macro level (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Third, 
although the control mechanisms and the decision-making dynamics we described above are prevalent 
across emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013),
viii
 there may still be some sample peculiarity issues 
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and more cross-country comparative studies could be done to further justify the state-control perspective 
in the future. Fourth, given the common organizational and governance structures of SOEs, our 
state-control perspective could be extended to contexts other than globalization, such as entrepreneurship, 
innovations, and corporate financing.  
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H1a: 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) < 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
H1b: 𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎)  𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
 
H2a: 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) < 𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒓𝒆−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
H2b: 𝜷𝑶(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎)  𝜷𝒑(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕−𝒓𝒆𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒎) 
 
H3a: 𝜷𝑷(𝟏𝒔𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑)  𝜷𝑷(𝟐𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑) 
H3b: 𝜷𝑶(𝟏𝒔𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑) < 𝜷𝑶(𝟐𝒏𝒅 𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒑) 
 
Fig. 1. An anatomy of state control in SOEs’ globalization. 
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Table 1. State Control on SOEs’ Globalization Before and After the Governance Reform: the Chinese 
Experience 
 
 Before Governance Reform After Governance Reform 
Governance system 
Administrative orders in making capital 
allocation, ownership, location, and other 
decisions. 
Market-based mechanisms in deciding host- 
country investment strategies for the pursuit 
of returns. 
 State-manager 
relationship 
Alignment of interest; SOE managers are 
directly appointed by the state and usually 
serve as government officials, which means 
they are more politically incentivized. 
Conflicts of interest; SOE managers are more 
often elected through shareholder meetings 
and behave like professional managers, which 
means they are more economically 
incentivized. 
State’s property rights  
Unification of ownership and control (such 
as a large number of non-tradable shares). 
Partial separation of ownership and control 
(such as dispersed state ownership). 
State’s control rights 
State possesses all control rights (in some 
partially privatized SOEs, voting rights are 
proportional to shareholdings). 
Voting rights are proportional to 
shareholdings. 
SOEs’ dividend policy 
None; most profit is re-invested in focal 
SOEs. 
The state proposes at least 10% profit paid to 
all shareholders (including state) as dividends. 
SOEs’ objectives 
Fulfilling political, social, and economic 
objectives with political and social goals as 
the dominant objectives in globalization. 
Fulfilling political and economic objectives, 
with economic ones becoming more important 
in globalization. 
Information asymmetry 
between state and 
manager 
 
Low asymmetry; the manager, at a low level 
of the bureaucratic system, is closely 
watched by state administrators. 
High; the state is unable to evaluate 
managers’ performance accurately, especially 
in foreign markets. 
Method of state control 
Hierarchy and administration; 
authority-oriented (such as capital control on 
the selection and approval of certain SOEs to 
go global). 
Separation of decision control (board) and 
decision execution (top management team). 
Involvement-oriented; managers are more 
professional and given more autonomy and 
responsibility in making foreign investment 
decisions. 
Incentive structure 
Control and monitor using political career 
under the cadre promotion system. 
Facilitate and empower using the cadre 
promotion system and pecuniary incentives. 
Globalization strategy by 
the state 
Increasing societal employment, acquiring 
critical resources, and enhancing diplomatic 
relationships in international politics. 
Updating economic and industry structures in 
the global value chain using overseas 
expansion; protecting energy and raw material 
supplies. 
Managers’ behaviors 
Government office status with the “iron 
bowl” (a secured job for life); conservative; 
seek stable and predictable strategies. 
Self-actualizing; become aggressive to win in 
a competitive environment; adapt quickly to 
new strategic opportunities with high-order 
needs. 
Governance weaknesses 
The absence of market mechanisms; risk 
aversion, biased judgments, and political 
patronage. 
Unification of the economic and political 
interests of the state and managers can 
occasionally be tenuous and problematic. 
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Table 2. Variable Definition 
Variable name Description Source  
 A. Dependent variables  
Decision of going 
abroad 
(GOGLOBAL) 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is involved in globalization during the 
first step and 0 otherwise (Sun et al., 2014). 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Datastream 
Degree of 
globalization 
(DOG) 
DOG is measured as an index, which takes the average of three firm-level 
globalization indicators: (1) the ratio of the company’s foreign sales to its total 
sales; (2) the ratio of the company’s foreign assets to its total assets; (3) the ratio of 
the number of the company’s overseas branches and subsidiaries to the number of 
the company’s total branches and subsidiaries (both domestic and foreign). This 
measure depicts the extent of geographical-operations dispersion across countries 
(Stopford & Wells, 1972) and is widely applied in globalization research 
(Contractor, Kundu, & Hsu, 2003; Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Gomes 
& Ramaswamy, 1999). 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Datastream 
 B. Explanatory variables  
 State control  
Government 
ownership 
Measured as the proportion of the firm’s total shares owned by the central or local 
government or authorities (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012). 
WIND, CSMAR 
State ultimate 
control 
An alternative measure of state control, measured as a dummy variable that equals 
1 if the actual ultimate controller (based either on ownership or voting rights)
ix
of 
the firm is the state or governmental authorities, and 0 otherwise (Inoue et al., 
2013; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2012). 
WIND, CSMAR, 
CCER database 
Managerial 
political 
connections 
Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the top manager worked in the 
government, government-related agencies, or the military, or was/is a member of 
the national, provincial, or municipal Congress, and 0 otherwise (Faccio, 2006; 
Fan et al., 2007: Li & Qian, 2013). 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
annual reports 
Board political 
connections 
Measured as the percentage of the number of board members with political ties to 
the total number of the directors on the board. 
 
 SOE managers’ capability  
Manager 
overseas 
experience 
Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the top manager has international 
work experience (including experience in a MNC) or international education, and 0 
otherwise. This captures the critical role of managers’ global mindset as both a 
cultural and strategic concept for successful corporate globalization and to achieve 
economic returns, particularly outside managers’ home regions (Levy, Beechler, 
Taylor, & Bovacigiller, 2007). Such a global mindset can be acquired by 
international exposure, such as international education and international work 
experience, as cultural intelligence. 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
annual reports 
Manager 
technology 
Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the top manager previously worked 
in the technology sector, and 0 otherwise. 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
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experience annual reports 
Manager 
education 
Measured by a score ranging from 0 to 4: zero if a manager’s highest education 
level is below junior college; one in the case of junior college; two in the case of a 
bachelor degree; three if the manager has graduated with a master’s degree; and 
four for a doctoral degree. Data are manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
annual reports 
 C. Control Variables  
Profitability Measured as the accounting-based return on asset (ROA) calculated by the net 
income over the total book value of assets, as well as the market-based Tobin’s Q 
calculated as the total equity market value over the total equity book value. Both 
the ROA and the Tobin’s Q are winsorized at the 5% level. 
WIND 
Innovation Measured as the number of patents a firm filed at China’s State Intellectual 
Property Office during each studied year divided by the number of employees. 
This measurement, to some extent, captures the resource-based view (RBV) 
arguments (Sun, Peng, Ren, & Yan, 2012). 
China’s State 
Intellectual 
Property Office 
Inward FDI Measured as the logarithm of the total inward FDI of the local province and 
adjusted by the GDP at the province level to gauge the FDI-spillover effect.  
China Statistical 
Yearbook 
Leverage Measured as the ratio of the total debts to the total assets to capture the financial 
constraints and insolvency capabilities of the company. 
WIND 
IPO age Measured as the number of years since the firm’s initial public offering, an 
indicator of how capitalized a firm is or the degree of privatization of the focal 
firm (being publicly traded can be seen as a symbol of being transformed from 
state owned to privatized). 
WIND 
Firm size Measured as the logarithm of the value of total assets. WIND 
Manager 
academia 
Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager has previously worked 
in academia as a university professor or researcher and 0 otherwise. Data are 
manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
annual reports 
Manager 
nationality 
Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager is non-Chinese, and 0 
if Chinese. Data are manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
annual reports 
Manager age Measured as the manager’s age in the year reported. Data are manually collected 
from managers’ CVs. 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
annual reports 
Manager gender Measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 if the manager is female, and 0 if he is 
male. Data are manually collected from managers’ CVs. 
WIND, CSMAR, 
Sina Finance, 
annual reports 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Go Global (dummy) 14,864 0.135 0.341 0 1 
Degree of globalization (DOG) 15,164 0.013 0.044 0 0.618 
Government ownership (%) 15,544 24.556 25.791 0 100 
State ultimate control 14,650 0.638 0.481 0 1 
Manager political connections 16,419 0.203 0.402 0 1 
Board political ties 15,190 0.129 0.160 0 1 
Manager overseas experience 16,418 0.086 0.280 0 1 
Ln (Inward FDI) 16,124 12.814 1.526 5.680 15.26 
Leverage (%) 16,666 0.632 7.121 0 877.256 
Innovation  15,684 8.699 52.670 0 2800 
ROA 15,618 3.896 5.436 -9.607 14.241 
Tobin’s q  15,519 3.049 2.245 0.916 9.208 
Size (Ln(assets)) 15,642 21.350 1.240 10.842 28.659 
IPO age 16,557 7.430 4.774 0 21 
Manager technology 16,421 0.426 0.494 0 1 
Manager academia 16,420 0.108 0.311 0 1 
Manager nationality 16,424 0.011 0.104 0 1 
Manager education  16,292 2.356 0.902 0 4 
Manger age 16,353 46.435 6.886 21 75 
Manager gender 16,423 0.051 0.219 0 1 
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Table 4. Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Government ownership 1.000                  
(2) State ultimate control 0.595
a
 1.000                 
(3) Manager political -0.004 -0.033 1.000                
(4) Board political ties -0.032
a
 0.027
a
 0.202
a
 1.000               
(5) Manager overseas -0.049
a
 -0.076
a
 -0.045
a
 -0.031
a
 1.000              
(6) Manager technology 0.145
a
 0.179
a
 -0.070
a
 -0.023
a
 -0.046
a
 1.000             
(7) Manager educ, degree -0.013 0.033
a
 -0.020
b
 -0.016
c
 0.101
a
 0.037
a
 1.000            
(8) Ln (Inward FDI) -0.261
a
 -0.150
a
 -0.037
a
 0.041
a
 0.079
a
 -0.054
a
 0.082
a
 1.000           
(9) Leverage -0.003 -0.023
a
 -0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.014
c
 -0.005 -0.001 1.000          
(10) ROA (Winsor.) -0.079
a
 -0.102
a
 0.041
a
 -0.015
c
 0.054
a
 0.054
a
 0.053
a
 0.151
a
 -0.038
a
 1.000         
(11)Tobin’s q (Winsor.) -0.217a -0.186a -0.015c 0.048a 0.022a -0.046a 0.075a 0.106a -0.018b 0.159a 1.000        
(12) Innovation -0.023
a
 0.020
b
 -0.015
c
 0.041
a
 0.017
b
 0.057
a
 0.068
a
 0.056
a
 -0.003 0.065
a
 -0.015
c
 1.000       
(13) Size  0.117
a
 0.246
a
 0.001 0.019
b
 0.035
a
 0.133
a
 0.125
a
 0.109
a
 -0.101
a
 0.155
a
 -0.142
a
 0.234
a
 1.000      
(14) IPO age -0.133
a
 0.094
a
 -0.061
a
 0.138
a
 -0.030
a
 -0.056
a
 0.107
a
 0.132
a
 0.032
a
 -0.191
a
 0.127
a
 -0.005 0.117
a
 1.000     
(15) Manager academia 0.008 0.003 0.003 -0.006 0.021
a
 0.072
a
 0.135
a
 0.039
a
 -0.008 0.043
a
 0.032
a
 0.033
a
 -0.014
c
 -0.059
a
 1.000    
(16) Manager nationality -0.067
a
 -0.071
a
 -0.030
a
 0.009 0.264
a
 -0.049
a
 -0.023
a
 0.044
a
 -0.003 0.028
a
 0.040
a
 0.005 -0.005 -0.035
a
 -0.029
a
 1.000   
(17) Manger age 0.026
a
 0.131
a
 0.077
a
 0.031
a
 -0.046
a
 0.035
a
 -0.199
a
 0.096
a
 -0.014
c
 0.048
a
 0.025
a
 0.023
a
 0.175
a
 0.163
a
 0.001 0.043
a
 1.000  
(18) Manager gender -0.068
a
 -0.063
a
 0.022
a
 -0.006 0.010 -0.079
a
 0.014
c
 0.034
a
 -0.000 0.033
a
 0.008 0.028
a
 -0.016
c
 0.008 -0.007 0.011 0.021
a
 1.000 
Superscript a: p < 0.01; b: p < 0.05; c: p < 0.10. 
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Table 5. Globalization by SOEs: Subsample Analysis 
 Pre-Reform Sample  Post-Reform Sample 
 1st step 2nd step  1st step 2nd step 
 DV = GOGLOBAL DV = DOG  DV = GOGLOBAL DV = DOG 
State ownership control      
Government ownership -0.135   -0.164  
 (0.115)   (0.104)  
State ultimate control  -0.001   0.010** 
  (0.007)   (0.006) 
Political connections      
Manager political  0.191*** -0.003  -0.099* 0.002 
 (0.068) (0.006)  (0.059) (0.008) 
Board political ties 0.773*** -0.001  0.333 0.040** 
 (0.179) (0.019)  (0.130) (0.016) 
Manager capability      
Manager overseas 0.279*** 0.011  0.218*** 0.019** 
 (0.092) (0.010)  (0.074) (0.009) 
Manager technology 0.154** 0.003  -0.047 0.017*** 
 (0.061) (0.007)  (0.045) (0.005) 
Manager education  0.061* -0.012***  0.117*** -0.005* 
 (0.033) (0.004)  (0.026) (0.003) 
Control variables      
Ln (Inward FDI) 0.178*** 0.003  0.188*** 0.002 
 (0.022) (0.003)  (0.020) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.004 0.001  -0.023 0.008** 
 (0.028) (0.005)  (0.017) (0.003) 
ROA -0.006 0.002***  0.019*** -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.001) 
Tobin’s Q -0.087*** 0.004  -0.040*** 0.001 
 (0.031) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.001) 
Innovation 0.001** 0.0002***  0.003*** -0.000*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size   -0.001   0.007*** 
  (0.004)   (0.002) 
IPO age 0.050*** -0.003**  -0.007 -0.003*** 
 (0.010) (0.001)  (0.006) (0.001) 
Manager academia -0.045 -0.004  -0.003 -0.018** 
 (0.088) (0.009)  (0.070) (0.009) 
Manager nationality 0.412 0.130***  -0.489** -0.045 
 (0.277) (0.023)  (0.250) (0.032) 
Manager age 0.015*** 0.001***  0.011*** 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.0005)  (0.003) (0.000) 
Manager gender -0.275* 0.038**  -0.412*** 0.005 
 (0.153) (0.017)  (0.110) (0.015) 
Constant  -4.215*** 0.059  -4.347*** -0.004 
 (0.396) (0.091)  (0.335) (0.068) 
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.023*   -0.045*** 
  (0.013)   (0.011) 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -1323.046   -2354.048  
Number of observations 4230   6918  
Wald Chi-square 149.35***   86.73***  
* 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level. 
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Table 6. Globalization by SOEs: Natural Experiment 
 First Step  Second Step 
 DV = GOGLOBAL  DV = DOG 
State ownership control      
Government ownership -0.155 (0.107)    
Government ownership × Post-reform dummy 0.025 (0.144)    
State ultimate control    -0.006 (0.008) 
State ultimate control × Post-reform dummy    0.019** (0.011) 
      
Political connections      
Manager political 0.149** (0.065)  -0.004 (0.008) 
Manager political × Post-reform dummy -0.230*** (0.086)  0.004 (0.011) 
Board political ties 0.899*** (0.170)  0.011 (0.020) 
Board political ties × Post-reform dummy -0.621*** (0.209)  0.034 (0.025) 
      
Post-reform dummy -1.359*** (0.291)  -0.005 (0.009) 
      
Manager capability      
Manager overseas 0.255*** (0.057)  0.016** (0.007) 
Manager technology 0.009 (0.035)  0.011*** (0.004) 
Manager education  0.099*** (0.020)  -0.009*** (0.003) 
      
Control variables      
Ln (Inward FDI) 0.188*** (0.014)  0.002 (0.002) 
Leverage -0.016 (0.012)  0.006** (0.003) 
ROA 0.010*** (0.003)  0.001* (0.000) 
Tobin’s Q -0.036*** (0.009)  0.001 (0.001) 
Innovation 0.002*** (0.000)  -0.000** (0.000) 
Size     0.005*** (0.002) 
IPO age 0.006 (0.005)  -0.003*** (0.001) 
Manager academia -0.016 (0.054)  -0.013** (0.006) 
Manager nationality -0.108 (0.173)  -0.067*** (0.019) 
Manger age 0.012*** (0.003)  0.001* (0.000) 
Manager gender -0.357*** (0.087)  0.015 (0.012) 
Constant  -4.480*** (0.257)  0.000 (0.055) 
Inverse Mills ratio    -0.037*** (0.009) 
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes  
Log likelihood  -3739.401     
Number of observations 11148     
Wald Chi-square 155.32***     
* 10% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *** 1% significance level
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i
 In April 2005 (effective from 2006), the Chinese government initiated the split-share structure reform of 
turning non-tradable shares (owned by the government) into tradable shares (called the share-issue privatization 
(SIP)) for all listed domestic firms. More than 1,400 listed companies could “gradually” convert their 
non-tradable shares. Holders of non-tradable shares compensated holders of tradable shares in each individual 
firm for approximately 3 shares per 10 shares on average so as to make the non-tradable shares tradable. All 
Chinese-listed companies completed their negotiations by the end of 2008 and all of their restricted shares 
became fully tradable by the end of 2011. 
ii
 This is confirmed by our interviews with several SOE managers (the interview transcripts are available upon 
request). See also the recent special report by Economist on World Economy: The gated globe. “Capital: just in 
case” (pp.10-12, Oct. 12th, 2013) 
iii
 We exclude Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong abroad as they are subject to a different institutional 
environment and regulations. 
iv
 A-share refers to the stocks being valued in RMB and available only to Chinese citizens. These are in contrast 
to B-share stocks that are denominated in RMB but traded in such foreign currencies such as the U.S. or Hong 
Kong dollar. 
v
 We endeavor to coordinate different data sets in a consistent way since we have drawn on a variety of sources. 
More specifically, our unit of analysis is on the firm level and the firm’s managerial backgrounds (each firm 
usually only has one general manager) are matched with the firm’s characteristics. Macro-level data such as the 
province dummies and provincial-inward FDI are matched with firm-level data and are taken with a natural 
logarithm to smooth out extreme values. 
vi
 We generate a dummy variable indicating whether or not the observation belongs to the post-reform sample, 
and an interaction term between this dummy variable and the “manager political” variable. We then test whether 
the coefficients of these variables are jointly zero. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero, 
implying that the coefficients of “manager political” during the pre-reform and post-reform samples are 
statistically significantly different. 
vii
 The Economist, Reforming China’s state-owned firms: From SOE to GLC, November 23, 2013. 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21590562-chinas-rulers-look-singapore-tips-portfolio-
management-soe-glc  
viii
 Many firms in Brazil, Russia, India, and China sometimes use a third country such as Cyprus, Mauritius, 
Hong Kong, and the British Virgin Islands to overcome the regulation burdens of capital control in globalization 
(Hoskisson et al., 2013). However, SOEs, with states’ blessings, may have relatively limited burdens in capital 
control, according to World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2011: 31), “the number and proportion of SOEs that 
have become transnational is relatively small.” For example, only 32 out of over 900 SOEs are MNCs in France 
that have invested abroad (UNCTAD, 2011; 2013), suggesting that SOEs could be highly selected in the first 
step of a globalization decision. 
ix
 “Ultimate controller” is defined as the largest shareholder by the number of shares being held, or whose 
voting rights exceed the largest shareholder of the company, or the shareholder that holds more than 30% of 
equity stakes and voting rights, or who can determine the nomination of more than half of the directors by 
exerting voting rights (according to CSMAR). The state could have a pyramid structure in order to control 
private firms. Our definition of controller is similar to that in Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2000). 
